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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1953
period of time sufficient to establish a standard for reasonably ascer-
taining potential future profits." Only one decision in Washington
specifically allowed recovery for loss of goodwill; it is distinguishable
because a malicious, willful destruction of property and business opera-
tions, and not conversion, was involved." The Court there stated that
such facts did not require the usual degree of exactness in determining
the total amount of the loss suffered. However, even in that case the
plaintiff's evidence was quite detailed as to receipts, expenses and
profits of the business for some time prior to its interruption.
The Court's decision in this case has weakened considerably its
position that the value of goodwill cannot be recovered in a conversion
action. Also, under the facts of the instant case, the jury, and in turn,
the Court, in awarding'damages, had to rely on opinion evidence of a
highly speculative nature which has little probative value.
RICHARD K. QuIN
Lease--Construction of Liquidated Damages Provision. In Mon Wai v. Parks, 143
Wash. Dec. 518, 262 P.2d 196 (1953), the plaintiff lessors sought to collect from the
defendant lessees unpaid rent which had accrued prior to the termination of the lease.
The lease, which had been terminated for breach of covenant to pay, provided
that in event of the lessees' failure to carry out the terms of the lease, lessors should
have the option to terminate, "and all moneys paid by the Lessees to the Lessors shall
be forfeited as liquidated damages to Lessors." In reversing judgment for plaintiff,
the court held that by this provision, the parties limited lessors' damages, upon termina-
tion for breach, to moneys paid by lessees as their contribution toward construction of
building on demised premises, and that therefore the lessor could not recover overdue
rent.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Disposition of Property in Divorce. In High v. High- all of the
property before the court for disposition was held by the parties as
tenants in common. The trial court awarded certain property to each
of the parties, and in addition ordered that three tracts of land be sold
by the parties within six months, recognizing that the tracts had been
bought by the parties for speculation, were practically valuless now,
but might become valuable at a later time. If not sold within the six
months period, either party had the right to apply for an order of the
court to have the property sold at public sale.
The Supreme Court reversed that portion of the decree providing
20 Hole v. Unity Petroleum Corp., 15 Wn.2d 416, 131 P.2d 150 (1942). Bogart v.
Pitchless Lumber Co., 72 Wash. 417, 130 Pac. 490 (1913).
21 Seidell v. Taylor, 86 Wash. 645, 151 Pac. 41 (1915).
141 Wn2d 811, 252 P.2d 272 (1953).
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for an order of sale, on the grounds that it was an abuse of discretion.
Stating that the problem was one of first impression in this state,' the
court held that the trial court may not, in a divorce proceeding, order
a sale of property held by the parties as tenants in common, citing as
authority In re Carroll,3 a California case.
It should be noted that the Carroll case is based on a statute giving
the court in a divorce proceeding the power to partition or sell com-
munity property of the parties, and the decision prohibits the applica-
tion of that statute to property held by the parties as tenants in
common, making for a very narrow holding. The Washington statute5
provides that the court shall make a just and equitable disposition of
all the property of the parties to a divorce action, both community and
separate, without specifying any manner of disposition. Cases decided
under the Washington statute demonstrate that the discretion of the
trial court in this regard is very broad.' Since the statutes are not
comparable, it is questionable if the California case is authority for
the ruling in the principal case.
It would seem, further, that this restriction on the power of the
court was not essential for the disposal of the case. In Wells v. Wells,"
decided in 1924, and noted in the principal case, it was held not to be
an abuse of discretion to award a producing ranch to the parties as
tenants in common, where it served the best economic interests of the
parties. In the principal case, the decision rested on the fact that the
tracts had been bought for speculation and it would be to the best
economic interests of the parties not to sell at this time, which would
bring the case directly within the holding of Wells v. Wells.
However, in Shaffer v. Shaffer,' subsequent to the High decision, it
appears that the court ignored the essence of both the High and Wells
cases. There the principal property before the court for disposition
was an apartment building in which each of the parties had an interest.
The court made no determination as to the kind of property, but noted
2 Cf. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 143 Wash. Dec. 101, 260 P.2d 875 (1953). The
trial court awarded an undivided one-half interest in the property to the parties, with
the further order that the property should be disposed of by agreement between them
within six months, and if not by that date, then "said property shall be sold and the
proceeds divided between the parties." This, however, was not made an issue in the
case, and was not decided by the Supreme Court.
3 133 Cal. App. 672, 28 P.2d 84 (1933).
4 CAL. CiV. CODE § 147 (Deering 1944).
5 RCW 26.08.110.
8 Holm v. Holm 27 Wn.2d 456, 178 P.2d 725 (1947).
7 130 Wash. 578, 228 Pac. 692 (1924).
8 143 Wash. Dec. 579, 262 P.2d 763 (1953).
[MAY
WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1953
that apparently it had belonged to the wife as separate property at
the time of coveture, and that the husband had made improvements
on it. The trial court awarded the property to the parties as tenants
in common, which award the Supreme Court reversed on the grounds
that it put the property into the same class as community property not
brought before the court, and that it did not finally determine the rights
of the parties after the divorce, a subsequent partition action being
necessary. The court stated that such an award was not a performance
of the court's statutory duty to dispose of the property brought before
it.9
These three cases would seem to be the leading cases in the field of
property disposition in divorce actions. However, even when narrowed
to the facts in each instance, the holdings would appear to be incon-
sistent.1"
The Shaffer case would also seem to be inconsistent with Nelson v.
Nelson,"1 another 1953 case, in which the court recognized, in principle
at least, the discretion of the trial court to award property to the parties
as tenants in common. There the main issue was custody of teen-age
children, but the court recognized that the home-of the parties had
been awarded to the parents as tenants in common, with sole right of
possession in the wife during the minority of the children and a provi-
sion that the husband should pay a mortgage against the property.
There was no discussion as to the propriety of the trial court's making
such a disposition of the property; rather, the decree was affirmed with
the added provision that the mortgage payments were to become a
lien on the proceeds from the sale of the property, if and when sold.
Thus, it would seem that in the Nelson case the awarding of the prop-
erty to the parties in common was acknowledged to be a proper per-
formance of the court's statutory duty.
Alimony in Lieu of Social Security Benefits. In Patrick v. Patrick 2
the parties were each granted a divorce by the trial court, and a
0 ".. . and making such disposition of the property of the parties, either community
or separate, as shall appear just and equitable . . ." supra note 5.
20(1) Property held as tenants in common at the time of divorce cannot be ordered
sold by the court. High v. High, supra note 1. (2) It is not an abuse of discretion to
award community property to parties as tenants in common where there is a showing
of economic reason therefor. Wells v. Wells, supra note 7. (3) It is the duty of the
divorce court, by statute, to dispose of all the property of the parties, and it is not a
performance of that duty to award property to the parties as tenants in common.
Shaffer v. Shaffer, supra note 8.
12 143 Wash. Dec. 257, 260 P.2d 886 (1953).
12 143 Wash. Dec. 128, 260 P.2d 878 (1953).
1954]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
property division was made on the basis of their separate property.
The husband's property consisted principally of two large trusts of
which he was beneficiary; the wife's property comprised gifts made
to her by her husband during marriage. Funds earned by the husband
during coveture were deemed to have been dissipated on living expenses
during the marriage. The trial court refused to grant the wife alimony,
which claim she made on the sole basis that community funds had
gone into payment of social security taxes from which she would receive
no benefit by virtue of this divorce.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decree except with respect to the
claim for alimony and allowed the wife $50 per month alimony, stating:
• . . (W)e believe the court erred in failing to make some provision for
reasonable alimony to the wife, since, in our opinion, appellant should be
compensated in some manner for her potential interest in the Social Security
benefits of the husband as to which, under federal law, she will lose all rights
by virtue of the divorce.13
The general rule is that in determining the ability of the husband to
pay alimony, the consideration of expectations is permissible. In a
Washington case" for separate maintenance, the court took into con-
sideration the fact that the husband would retire from the Navy within
a month, and awarded a certain sum for separate maintenance until
retirement with a reduction on retirement. And in a New Jersey case,"
the court included the husband's social security benefits in determining
his ability to pay alimony on his application for reduction of the pay-
ments. That case, however, should be distinguished in that he was at
the time receiving the social security benefits.
The decision is difficult to justify on the basis that the husband will
receive benefits which should by right accrue to the wife. It assumes
that the husband will acquire the social security benefits, and yet he
was at the time of the trial forty-eight years of age and in poor health.
It also awards to the wife at the present time benefits which she would
not, if married, receive until her husband reached the age of sixty-five.
Further, it is possible that under the circumstances of this case she
would never be eligible for a wife's benefit under the Social Security
Act.
Assuming that the parties were married when the husband reached
is Id. at 132, 260 P.2d at 881.
1466 A.L.R. 219 (1929).
15 Holland v. Holland, 139 Wash. 424, 247 Pac. 455 (1926).16 Sassman v. Sassman, 1 N.J. Super. 306, 64 A.2d 357 (1949).
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the age of sixty-five, the total maximum benefit which an individual
may receive under the Act is $80 per month. This maximum amount,
however, is based on continuous employment at a wage of $300 or more
per month. The evidence in this case shows that the husband has spent
several periods in a sanitarium, and there is no showing that he is
working at the present time. Therefore, by the time he reaches the
age of sixty-five, he may be entitled to far less than $80 per month.
The maximum insurance benefit for a wife is equal to one-half of
the old-age insurance benefit of her husband. 18 It is thus apparent that
the allowance of $50 per month to the wife is in excess of even her
maximum expectation under the Social Security Act. Further, a wife's
insurance benefit is dependent on the fact that she herself is not entitled
to old-age insurance benefits of more than this amount. The court
states that the wife had worked. If she were covered by social security
for a period of forty quarters before she was sixty-five, her average
monthly earning would be computed, and she would be entitled to either
her benefit as an individual, or to her wife's benefit, whichever was
the greater."
However, it should be noted that under the Act, if the husband dies
before the age of sixty-five, being fully insured as defined in the Act,
his widow, upon attaining the age of sixty-five may make a claim in
the amount of three-fourths of the primary insurance amount of her
deceased husband.20 Under these circumstances, the highest amount
to which she would ever be entitled is $60.00 per month,2 dependent
on her ineligibility to receive a greater benefit as an individual.2" This
right of the wife is lost if she was not living with the husband at the
time of his death.2"
The court in the Patrick case has ruled that this forfeiture of a right
to make a claim is sufficient ground for an award of alimony to the
wife, even, though the right of claim is contingent on (1) the death of
the husband, (2) the amount of his social security contributions,
(3) her reaching the age of sixty-five, and (4) not being eligible for
benefits herself.
*7Expanded Social Security, The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Retirement
Benefits Computer, 34 (1950).
1864 STAT. 477 (1950), 42 U.S.C.APP. § 402 (b) (2) (Supp. 1946).
1964 STAT. 477 (1950), 42 U.S.C.APP. § 402(b) (1) (D) (Supp. 1946).
2064 STAT. 477 (1950), 42 U.S.C.APP. § 402(e) (2) (Supp. 1946).21Supra note 17, Security Benefits Computer, 35.
2264 STAT. 477 (1950) 42 U.S.C.App. § 402(e) (1) (E) (Supp. 1946).
2864 STAT. 477 (1950), 42 U.S.C.App. § 402 Ce) (1) (D) (Supp. 1946).
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Juvenile Court-Power and Jurisdiction. Two decisions handed
down during 1953 appear to restrict the power of the juvenile court
regarding the permanency of orders which that court may make.
RCW 13.04, pertaining to juvenile courts, would seem to have been
specifically drawn. RCW 13.04.010 defines dependency and delin-
quency under twenty separate subsections. RCW 13.04.020 makes
dependent or delinquent children wards of the state, subject to control
of the court. RCW 13.04.100 gives the juvenile court power to commit
a dependent or delinquent child to an institution or association which
will find a home for him, with a proviso that such committing order may
be "permanent or temporary" and may be revoked or modified. RCW
13.04.140, however, specifies that no delinquent or dependent child
may be taken from its parents or legal guardian unless the juvenile
court finds one of three separate grounds." RCW 13.04.150 provides
that any order made in the case of a dependent or delinquent child
may be changed, modified or set aside at any time.
In the case of In re Sickles," the juvenile court found the child a
dependent child within the definition of RCW 13.04.010(8),26 and
after a hearing, made an order permanently depriving the parents of
custody of this child. The Supreme Court remanded on the ground
that the condition of dependency under which the child had been de-
clared a ward of the court was not such that the court had the power
to permanently sever the natural parental relationship between the
parents and their child.
Two judges concurred in the result, but contended that the juvenile
court can make a permanent order regarding custody on any finding
of dependency defined in RCW 13.04.010, if the court also finds one
of the three conditions set forth in RCW 13.04.140. As the minority
pointed out, in the case of In re Miller," handed down in 1952, the
Supreme Court affirmed an order permanently depriving a father of
custody, and temporarily depriving the mother of the same, where the
dependency of the child was determined under the same subsection of
RCW 13.04.010 discussed in the principal case.
24 (1) Parent, parents or guardian is incapable or has failed or neglected to provide
maintenance, training and education for the child; (2) child has been on probation,
and has failed to report; (3) welfare of the child requires that its custody shall be
taken from the parent or guardian.
25 42 Wn.2d 17, 252 P.2d 1063 (1953).
26 "Whose home by reason of neglect, cruelty or the depravity of its parents or
either of them, or on the part of its guardian, or on the part of the person in whose
custody or care it may be, or for any other reason, is an unfit place for such child; ...
27 40 Wn.2d 319, 242 P.2d 1016 (1952).
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The Miller case, and cases cited therein,28 seem to have been decided
on a question of fact: whether or not the acts of the parent had been
such as to denote complete depravity with no hope that there might
be such a reform as would in the future warrant his or her again having
custody of the child. Perhaps the principal case might also have been
decided on its facts alone, as the minority suggests, rather than reading
into the juvenile court statutes a restraint not obviously intended by
the legislature, nor apparently previously considered by the courts.
In the second case handed down in 1953 regarding the juvenile court,
In re Walker,"' the Supreme Court held the juvenile court had gone
beyond its power in awarding custody of a delinquent child to its
mother for a period of one year, on the grounds that the dependency
status might cease at any time during that year, and therefore, the
juvenile court could not attempt to maintain a dependency status
absolutely during any set period of time. It would seem that in this
instance, the court has not taken into account the provisions of RCW
13.04.150 permitting modification of orders,"0 which is the safeguard
in the event the dependency status ceased during that period.
The Walker case also involves the jurisdiction of a court in a divorce
action over the custody of children who have been previously declared
wards of the juvenile court. The Supreme Court noted that the de-
cision of the divorce court was not before it at this time, since there
was here no appeal from the ruling to hold in abeyance the matter of
custody of the children until such time as they were no longer wards
of the juvenile court. However, it commented by way of dicta that
the divorce court had without doubt made the proper decision in that
case, pointing out that "any order which it (the divorce court) might
have made would have been a conditional one, pending or subject to
termination of the dependency status of the children."
3 1
No authority is cited for this statement, but it is interesting in the
light of Ex rel. Marmo, 22 which would seem to be completely contra-
dictory on this point. There, after the award of custody in a divorce
case to the mother, the father had the child declared dependent and
a ward of the juvenile court. He subsequently petitioned the divorce
court for a modification of the decree which would award custody of
28 Particularly In re Day, 189 Wash. 368, 65 P.2d 1049 (1937).
20 143 Wash. Dec. 655, 263 P2d 956 (1953).
so "Modification of Orders. Any order made by the court in a case of the dependent
or delinquent child may at any time be changed, modified or set aside."
32 Supra note 6, at 658, 263 P.2d at 959.
82 115 Wash. 154, 196 Pac. 577 (1921).
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the child to him, and the question presented was which court had
jurisdiction of the child. The Supreme Court said: "When the superior
court33 found the relator was a fit and proper person to have the custody
of her, at that moment the child ceased to be a dependent or delinquent
person, for whose protection the juvenile law was enacted."', This is
a square holding on the direct issue of jurisdiction between the two
courts. It cannot be presumed that the dicta in the principal case will
overrule the Marmo holding.
ALICE D. HUBBARD
Grounds for Divorce-Insanity. In Wolfe v. Wolfe, 42 Wn.2d 834, 258 P.2d 1211
(1953), an action for divorce brought on the grounds of cruelty, the husband was
granted a divorce by the trial court. The case was appealed by the wife (represented
by her guardian ad litem), who, according to the evidence introduced at the trial, had
been insane for more than two years preceding the commencement of the action. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that under RCW 26.08.020(10), where a party to a
divorce action has been suffering from chronic mania for a period of more than two
years prior to the beginning of the action, such insanity shall be the sole and exclusive
ground upon which the court may grant a divorce, and that this statute is a defense
to an action for divorce upon any other statutory grounds. This is the first case decided
under this section of the Divorce Act of 1949, and is a literal application of the statute.
EVIDENCE
Witnesses-Competency of Insane Person. The court in State v.
Moorison' affirmed the trial court's ruling that a person was a compe-
tent witness even though previously adjudicated insane by a Colorado
court. The precise question had not previously been before the court.'
The relevant Washington statute3 excluding persons of unsound mind
is merely declaratory of the common law. The present generally recog-
nized common law interpretation is that an insane person is competent
to testify if at the time of his presentation as a witness he understands
the nature of an oath and is capable of giving a correct account of
what he has seen and heard.' Dicta in the instant case indicated that
competency also depends on mental capacity at the time of the events
concerning which the witness is to testify.
The court further stated that competency is a matter within the
discretion of the trial court to be determined by the use of a voir dire
33 Reference is to Superior Court of Spokane County in which divorce proceedings
and subsequent modification of divorce decree were had.
34 Supra note 9, at 158, 196 Pac. at 578.
1 143 Wash. Dec. 21, 259 P.2d 1105 (1953).
2 Cf. State v. Hardung, 161 Wash. 379, 297 Pac. 167 (1931) ; Summerlin v. Depart-
ment of Labor and Industries, 8 Wn.2d 43, 111 P.2d 603 (1941) (guardian appointed).
3 RCW 5.60.050.
4 District of Columbia v. Ames, 107 U.S. 519 (1883).
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